Our office represented a couple at a lawsuit for agreed compensation on account of breaching a sales agreement for selling a second-hand apartment, in which the two parties were represented by one and the same advocate, while the buyers (defendants) started renovating the basement of the residential home without the knowledge or consent of the Sellers (claimants), thus obtaining possession of the residential apartment before paying the full consideration for it, and before the buyers were entitled to obtain possession of the apartment.    

As part of their defense, the buyers asserted that they had reached an understanding with the tenant at the apartment, pursuant to which they would be afforded access so as to carry out a renovation in the basement prior to obtaining possession of the apartment. However, the Court did not entertain said allegation, after the buyers had not summoned the tenant to testify in court about the truthfulness of their version. On this matter, the Court determined that the presumption that has come to be held is that if the tenant were summoned to testify – his testimony would operate to the detriment of the buyers (defendants).

Likewise, the Court rejected the buyers’ assertion, according to which the possibility of renovating the basement prior to handing over the possession had been discussed, since such possibility was not mentioned at all in the sales agreement. The Court also rejected the contention made by the lawyer (who represented both parties in the sales transaction), to the effect that this subject matter “had slipped his mind”, since we are concerned with a subject matter that is substantial for the nature of the claim.

The Court determined that the performance of renovations in part of the residential apartment amounts to obtaining possession of the residential apartment in its entirety.

Likewise, the Court rejected the defendants’ allegation, to the effect that they rectified the breach once they had paid the full consideration and this for the simple reason that the rectification of the breach (the performance of a substantial renovation) had to be done restoring the previously prevailing state of affairs, and not by paying the full consideration.
The Court eventually condemned the defendants to pay compensation in total amount of 36,341 NIS, as well as costs in the amount of 5,000 NIS, and this in consideration of the fact that the greater part of the consideration (80%) had been paid prior to the committing of the breach.

Our office represented a couple, who sold their house in the locality of Kadima for a total of 1,060,000 NIS, in a lawsuit against real estate broker on account of a breach of her duties towards them, due to an underestimation of the value of her house, which made the sellers sell their house for a consideration falling below its real value.

It should be pointed out that after the sellers had gotten into dispute with the buyer of the house, they ordered a statement of opinion to be made by an appraiser, which established that the house’s real value is higher by 390,000 NIS then the value at which it had been sold in reliance upon the broker. Likewise, the claimant discovered that the defendant had not at all held a license for brokerage in effect as of the date of concluding the transaction.

The Court established that the defendant had performed a brokerage operation for the claimants (after the latter asserted that she had not served at all as broker in the transaction), for which reason she owed the notional duty of care towards the claimants, as well as owing the duty of fairness by virtue of the principle of good faith. The fact that the defendant did not hold a valid brokerage license at the date of concluding the transaction (due to non-payment of fees) either increases or diminishes her liability towards the claimants.

The Court further established that, in light of the claimants’ acquaintance with the defendant (the broker) for years and due to their being an adult couple residing in Tel Aviv – they are not knowledgeable about the value of houses in the locality of Kadima for which reason the Court determined that the claimants had relied upon the defendant with regard to the value of the house.

The Court eventually established that the value of the house as of the date of its sale stood at 1,225,000 NIS (and this due to the run down state of repair of the house, as well as due to the betterment tax for rendering legal unlawful construction work performed in the house), and condemned the defendant to pay the claimants, a total of 165,000 NIS, plus the fees the claimant had paid the defendant, along with costs in the amount of 18,000 NIS

Our office represented a couple (the defendants and counter claimants), who entrusted a renovations contractor (the claimant and counter defendant) for carrying out works at their home in Sha’arei Tikva.

In this lawsuit, the renovations contractor sought to have the spouses condemned to pay the amount of 80,000 NIS that was not paid to him pursuant to the agreement between the parties. (who were represented by our office) asserted that the contractor had not completed the renovations works, had not carried those out continuously (which is expressly contrary to the provisions of the agreement between the parties), and at a low, diminished standard.

As part of the proceeding, the spouses filed a statement of opinion on behalf of an engineer, which establishes that in the works performed by the renovations contractor his allegation that evidentiary damage had been caused to him due to the fact that all the deficiencies set forth in the statement of opinion made by an engineer on behalf of the defendants had been remedied prior to the legal proceeding, and this in light of the fact that the contractor did not bother to make a request and/or to present any inquiry, according to which he sought to send for an expert on his behalf (whether as part of the legal proceeding or before it), even though he knew that a dispute existed between the parties concerning the renovation works performed by him.

Further, the Court determined that it would not stand to reason that a family consisting of 8 members would be required to keep on living at a construction site thrown out in order to make it possible for a contractor to send for an expert on his behalf.

The Court eventually dismissed the lawsuit of the renovations contractor in its entirety, entertained the counteraction filed by the defendants, and condemned the contractor to pay the amount of 75,490 NIS, as well as costs in the amount of 9,000 NIS.

Our office represented the defendant, a company for the management of a  condominium also operating as an apartments hotel in the beach line at the promenade in Tel Aviv, in a lawsuit filed against it by one of the tenants of the building, as well as in a connection bought by it against the tenant (claimant).  

As part of the tenant’s main legal action, he sought a declaratory relief from the Magistrates’ Court in Tel Aviv, which indicates that the defendant (the management company) is not entitled to collect management fees, and in the alternative to have a declaratory order issued, which clarifies what the management company’s right to collect management fees consist in.

Conversely, the management company filed, through our office, a counteraction in the amount of 44,069 NIS on account of the debt owed by the tenant for management fees.

The Court dismissed the lawsuit filed by the tenant and entertained the counteraction filed by the management company, and determined that the management company is entitled to collect management fees from the claimant in light of the provisions of the management agreement. Further, the court determined that the management fees include, among others, expenses on account of private dwellings insurance, uniforms of reception clerks, mail, fees and licenses, expenses incurred by the office serving the management company, expenditures on legal services and accounting and more.

Lawsuit for the enforcement of a sales transaction that was concluded, on the assertion of the Claimant Ronen Nataniy, and Defendant No. 1, Shmon Pinchas Buskila, who was represented by our office.

By Nataniy’s account, Buskila undertook to sell him a building on 1 Matalon St. In Tel Aviv for a total of 4,300,000 NIS, as part of a “package deal”. Pursuant to that same package deal, Nataniy was supposed to sell Buskila his house in Rechovot for a total of 2,700,000 NIS. The difference between the prices of the two assets, the amount of 1,600,000 NIS – Nataniy was supposed to pay Buskila. Nataniy further asserted that after the conclusion of the sales transaction, Buskila backed away from his undertaking, hence the lawsuit, as part of which Nataniy seeks the enforcement solely of the sale of building.

Conversely, Buskila asserted that he had indeed agreed to sell the building to Nataniy in the name of his mother who is the holder of the rights to the building, but the agreed price was 7,000,000 NIS and not 4,300,000 NIS.

The Court dismissed the lawsuit and condemned Nataniy to pay costs to Buskila in the amount of 50,000 NIS.

The Petitioners (who were represented by our office) petitioned for a declaratory relief, pursuant to which they are the owners of the exclusive right of possession of specific areas in the Port of Tel Aviv, as well as for a mandamus directing the respondent (Otzar Mifalei Yam thus administering the compound of the Port of Tel Aviv) to surrender to them the possession of those areas, and this further to contracts concluded between the parties and after the respondent had breached its obligations, based upon the last contract that was concluded between the parties, to surrender to the petitioners the possession of the area which they had voluntarily vacated for purposes of renovating the port.

The Court entertained the petition and determined that Otzar Mifalei Yam breached its obligation to surrender the petitioners the areas concerned.

Likewise, the Court established that even though there was nothing to preclude Otzar Mifalei Yam from filing an evacuation claim against the petitioners, in actual fact it did not do so, bur chose to “get smart” and pulled off an extraordinary “trick of sorts”, as part of which it obtained, in fact by subterfuge and cunning, the areas for purposes of renovation and inhabitance during the authorization period, as it did not make it known to the petitioners that the area would not be given back to them. Otzar Mifalei Yam thus thought that it would be able to stage a complete turnaround, and instead of being the one who has to file the evacuation claim against the petitioners – in effect to force them into commencing the legal confrontation by way of filing a restitution claim.

The Court determined that Otzar Mifalei Yam had blatantly breached its obligation towards the respondents, observing that the government authorities, like any party to a contract, is under the obligation to honor agreements they sign. The authority’s duty to fulfill its obligation and promises is due to the duty of fairness imposed upon it: it is the generality held view that a government authority reneging on its promise (unilaterally) apparently does not act with fairness and reasonableness.

The Court established that, notwithstanding the established ruling mentioned below, in actual practice they were only few cases, in which a public authority was exempted from its contractual obligation based upon the ruling on partners being released from obligations. The guiding rule is that contracts have to be fulfilled, and that becoming exempt from having to fulfill the contract is to be regarded as an exemption, which can be justified only under extraordinary circumstances, in which the performance of the contract is not consistent with the governmental duty. The test in question is the test of vital public needs. When vital public needs are not consistent with the fulfillment of the contract and compliance with its terms – a right thus arises for the authority to become exempt from performing said contract. The authority in question has to point to those needs and their vitality, and merely a vague contention about public needs is not enough. The decision about such exemption makes it necessary to weight and to balance various interests against each other, including the credibility of the government and the interest of the other party to the engagement entered into it. It does not suffice to merely make a vague allegation. Rather, it is necessary to put forward an assessment, to the effect that vital public needs are in contradiction with the contractual obligation assumed by the authority, and that those cannot coexist with the contract. It is an exemption that has to be actually made in rare cases, whereby the authority has to act while having due regard for all the considerations relevant for this matter, in good faith, with the highest value and guiding principles being the need to fulfill contracts.

In this case, the Court determined that Otzar Mifalei Yam did not prove that this was about vital public needs, and no substantial detriment to the public has been proven that would reduce the value of government credibility to the status of a value to be set aside in the circumstances of the matter at hand, hence the contention made Otzar Mifalei Yam about “the ruling on exemption from obligations” was rejected.
The Court determined that there is nothing more just under the circumstances of the matter than to enforce the contract. In the case at hand, the balance of convenience and the general balance of the relevant considerations tip in favor of the petitioners. Under the circumstances of the matter, Otzar Mifalie  Yam was not able to meet the burden of proving that enforcement is not just under the circumstances of the case in question.

As part of a petition for issuing a preliminary prohibitory injunction, the petitioners requested the Magistrates’ Court in Tel Aviv to direct the respondents, who are owners of adjoining real estate, among them Zemach Hammerman Ltd., Eurocom Real Estate – Project Management Ltd and Neve Tzedek on the Sea Corporation (which were all represented by our office) to avoid using makeshift anchors that penetrate into the real estate of the petitioners.
In its decision of 14.4.11, The Court dismissed the petition for issuing a preliminary prohibitory injunction, while determining that the balance of convenience tips in favor of the respondents, and that the act performed by the respondents is in keeping with the Urban Building Scheme.

Fantazia Textiles Ltd and Euro Knit Ltd. held copyrights with a  franchise in Israel for marketing fabrics carrying figures from the world of Walt Disney, whereas the defendants (Srigei Levanon Ltd. and Srigei Levanon Marketing Ltd. held a similar franchise for France and the countries of the European Common Market.

Defendant No. 3 Moshe Weinbaum, served as the CEO of Defendant No. 2) Srigei Levanon Ltd.)

Several contracts were concluded between the claimants and Defendant No 2-3 between the year 1991-1993, pursuant to which they undertook to engage in cooperation for establishing a joint company that would manufacture and market the fabrics under the franchise of the claimants in Israel, as well as under the exclusive franchise the defendant held in France and in the countries of the European Common Market.

In the year 1993, the claimants brought an action to court against the defendant and Weinbaum for the cause of a breach of the engagement agreement between the parties, including for causes of unjust enrichment and of bringing about the breach of a contract and the fulfillment of a contract in bad faith.

Conversely, Weinbaum filed a petition for the actions against him to the dismissed in limine.

In its decision of 1.8.00, the Court dismissed the petition, while determining that in the facts agreed upon it was established that the defendants got unjustly enriched and that Weinbaum, in his capacity as an organ of the company is the one that brought this about, whether by himself or together with others. Hence, without Weinbaum, whether by himself or together with others, the company, could not have become unjustly enriched. Weinbaum, has thus to be regarded as responsible together with the defendants, for the enrichment. Hence, it is immaterial if said enrichment fell to Weinbaum’s share or to that of the companies. The result is, consequently, that a cause of actions exists against Weinbaum.

Both parties were associates in real estate in Petach Tikva, where the appellants held 40% of the real estate and the respondent held 60% of the real estate. As part of the action for dissolution of the association brought by the respondent, the parties reached an agreement to dissolving the association, under which it was agreed that the defendant would purchase the rights of the appellants in the real estate pursuant to a statement of opinion to be made by an appraiser thus appointed by the parties, who would thus determine the value of the real estate without deducting VAT, and that the determination of his would be binding upon the parties.

In the statement of opinion, the appraiser determined that the value of the appellants’ share in the real estate, exclusive VAT, stands at 2,631,200 NIS, and that the value of said share, inclusive VAT, stands at 3,104,816 NIS.

The parties differed over the amount that the respondent had to pay the appellants: the lower amount (exclusive VAT) or the higher amount (inclusive VAT)?  

In the action brought by the respondent, through our office, to the Magistrates’ Court in Petach Tikva, the respondent’s position was accepted to the effect that the appellants were entitled to the lower value (exclusive VAT).

The appellants filled an appeal against this decision.

The District Court in the Central Region District dismissed the appeal, and determined that this was about a dispute on appraisal, namely whether, for the purpose of appraising the value of the real estate the VAT amount has to be included. The appraiser made it known that, by his method; the value is not inclusive VAT, since we are concerned with real estate belonging to the company of business assets. Conversely, the appellants contended  that the appraiser was wrong in assuming that the market relevant for real estate is the market of dealers (for instance contractors), thus classifying the real estate as a business asset, since this market of private buyers, such as purchasing groups, had to be taken into account as well.

As stated, the Court rejected the contention, and laid down that the determination as to which market is concerned (the market of dealers or of private individuals) is a question for the appraiser too. Hence, where an agreed upon appraiser has been appointed and his determination may not be contested – the appellants are not entitled to dispute this determination of his.